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Abstract 
Recent research suggests that the relationship between inspection time (IT) and psychometric 
intelligence arises because IT is a measure of general speed of processing (Gs).  However, 
hierarchical models of intelligence propose several distinct speed of processing factors; this study 
examines IT in relation to these multiple speed factors.  Participants (N = 102) completed tests of 
speed of processing yielding 18 measures.  Factor analysis revealed a second order general speed 
factor (Gs) and four group factors: perceptual speed, visualisation speed, decision time and 
movement time.  IT correlated with a visualisation speed factor (r = .36) and with a perceptual 
speed factor (r = .28).  However, the correlation between IT and perceptual speed was near-zero 
when the correlation with visualisation speed was partialled out.  These findings are consistent with 
the notion that IT is a measure of Gs but suggest that IT most directly measures speed of 
visualisation processes.  These results are also congruent with research on the psychophysics of IT. 
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Inspection Time and General Speed of Processing 
Inspection time (IT) is one of many so-called elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs) that have 
been studied in an attempt to explain some of the variance in psychometric intelligence (i.e., IQ).  
Many researchers have replicated the finding of a relationship between IT and IQ with three 
reviews (Grudnik & Kranzler, 2001; Kranzler & Jensen, 1989; Nettelbeck, 1987) putting the 
corrected correlation at about –.5.  Despite wide interest, however, researchers have not been able to 
resolve fully the issue of what IT is measuring (Deary, 2000). 
A consistent finding of IT research has been that IT is more strongly related to performance 
IQ (PIQ) rather than with verbal IQ (VIQ) from the Wechsler scales (Kranzler & Jensen, 1989; 
Nettelbeck, 1987).  A common assumption was that PIQ measures fluid ability (Gf; Deary, 1993; 
Kline, 1991; Sattler, 1982) and, upon this basis, it was thought that IT measured Gf.  Indeed, it was 
even proposed that IT may provide a culture-free test of intelligence (Brand & Deary, 1982).  
However, recent research has rendered this latter interpretation untenable. 
For example, a study by Crawford, Deary, Allan and Gustafsson (1998) located IT within 
the factor structure of the WAIS – R.  Confirmatory factor analyses suggested three group factors 
and one general factor; these factors were all orthogonal.  IT loaded on a perceptual organisation 
factor (–.39) but only weakly on the general factor (i.e., g).  These findings led to the suggestion 
that IT was not related to ‘g’ directly but that it was related to the group factor perceptual 
organisation. 
Orienting their research by the Horn-Cattell model of intelligence (Horn & Cattell, 1966, 
Horn & Noll, 1994), Burns, Nettelbeck and Cooper (1999) reported that IT correlated with a test of 
general speed of processing (Gs) but not with tests of Gf or general visualisation ability (Gv).  This 
result has been replicated by Mackintosh and Bennett (2002) using different tests and a different 
participant population. Burns and Nettelbeck (in press), using a broad sampling of abilities tests, 
confirmed that IT provides a measure of Gs but does not measure Gf or Gv.  Based on these studies, 
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IT is most likely a marker of Gs, which suggests that the IT – IQ relationship may be mediated 
through a relationship between IT and Gs. 
Recent models of intelligence paint a complex picture of speed of processing abilities 
(Carroll, 1993; Horn, 1988; Robert & Stankov, 1999).  Horn (1988; 1989; Horn & Noll, 1994) 
extended Gf – Gc theory to include a speed factor called correct decision speed (CDS) derived from 
the speed with which people provide correct answers to a variety of tests.  Stankov and Roberts 
(1997; Roberts & Stankov, 1999) have proposed a hierarchical model of speed of processing with 
the most complex mental speed factor being test-taking speed (which is very similar to Horn’s 
correct decision speed).  Perceptual speed (PSp) was theorised to be the next most complex factor 
and is marked by tests such that, given enough time, almost anyone could complete all items 
correctly.  At the next level of complexity was decision time (DT), which represents the time 
required to make a simple decision based on sensory information. At the lowest level in this 
hierarchy was movement time (MT) which is a psychomotor ability with minimal cognitive 
requirements.  Stankov and Roberts (1997, p. 75) remarked “these various speed factors tend to 
define a single factor at the highest order of analysis” but they also noted that the strength of this 
factor is often weak.  Roberts & Stankov (1999) included a general speed factor in their model. 
However, Horn (1988) and Carroll (1993) did not.  Therefore, the status of a higher order general 
speed factor is debatable, being also clouded by uncertainty over the order of analysis at which such 
a factor might appear. 
Studies attempting to locate IT within hierarchical models of cognitive abilities have so far 
shown IT as related to Gs.  But given that Gs is factorially complex, it is worth re-examining the 
question of what IT is measuring.  Beginning at the lowest level of complexity of the proposed 
speed hierarchy, it has been consistently shown that IT is independent of MT (Burns & Nettelbeck, 
in press; Carroll, 1991; Kranzler & Jensen, 1991).  This follows because IT does not incorporate 
any psychomotor component.  Concerning DT, it has been shown that both IT and DT share 
variance with IQ (Jensen, 1982; Nettelbeck, 1987) but the literature is unclear on whether they 
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share common variance with IQ.  Kranzler and Jensen (1991) administered a battery of ECTs to 101 
university students and exploratory factor analysis revealed both DT and MT factors but IT did not 
load on either factor.  Carroll (1991) reanalysed these data and found that IT loaded on a factor 
defined by choice DT but was independent of a factor defined by ‘odd-man-out’ reaction time 
(OMO DT; see Frearson & Eysenck, 1986).  Bates and Eysenck’s (1993) study found the exact 
opposite; that is, IT was related to OMO DT but was independent of choice DT.  Finally, Burns and 
Nettelbeck (in press) found that OMO DT loaded on Gf while IT loaded on Gs, suggesting IT does 
not share variance with DT.  These four studies do not clarify the relationship between IT and DT 
but do suggest that IT may have differential relationships to choice DT and OMO DT. 
Concerning the perceptual speed (PSp) factor, the studies reviewed above (Burns & 
Nettelbeck, in press, Burns et al., 1999; Mackintosh & Bennett, 2002) have essentially taken PSp 
tests as markers for Gs and have concluded that because IT is related to these tests, that IT provides 
a measure of Gs. Finally, there have been no studies which have examined the relationship of IT to 
a CDS factor. 
This study therefore investigated the hierarchical structure of mental speed.  The presence of 
a higher order factor (Gs) was tested and the location of IT within this hierarchy was investigated.  
IT was expected to provide a measure of perceptual speed (PSp) and to load on the higher order 
factor (Gs) via this path. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants (N = 102) were 71 first year psychology students from the University of 
Adelaide and 31 people recruited from the wider community.  Thirty-four participants were male 
(mean age = 22.0, SD = 5.9 years) and 68 female (mean age = 19.7, SD = 4.6 years). 
Test Materials 
Three tests of perceptual speed (PSp) were administered.  (i) Digit Symbol, from the WAIS 
– R was administered following the instructions in the manual (Wechsler, 1981).  (ii) A mental 
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rotation task required that participants decide if two letters, or numbers, were identical or mirror 
images of one another; the second symbol had been rotated to a varying degree.  (iii) A cross out 
task required that participants cross out the exact copy of a group of letters, or numbers, among four 
choices.  For each of these tests, participants were given 90 sec to complete as many items as 
possible and the measure taken was the number correct. 
The IT stimulus was presented on a computer monitor approximately 0.5 m from the 
participant.  The target figure consisted of two vertical lines 22 mm and 27 mm long joined at the 
top by a horizontal line, 12 mm long.  The shorter line appeared on the left or right equiprobably.  
The target figure, preceded by a small white circle which acted as a warning cue, was presented for 
a short period and then followed by a “flash mask” (Evans & Nettelbeck, 1993) that lasted 
290 msec.  The flash mask consisted of two vertical lines each 37 mm long and shaped like 
lightning bolts.  Participants were required to indicate, via the keyboard, which line was shorter, the 
left or the right. 
The apparatus for presentation and responding for choice reaction time (CRT) was as 
described by Jensen & Munro (1979).  The apparatus was scaled down to consist of a panel, 15 x 
24 cm, painted white and tilted at a 30 deg angle.  Eight response keys (each with a corresponding 
red light) are arranged in a semi-circle around a home key.  The participants were instructed to hold 
down the home key and, after a pseudo-random period of 1 to 4 sec, one of the other eight lights 
came on.  The participant had to take their finger off the home key and push the appropriate 
response key as quickly as possible.  Responses were divided into a decision time component (DT, 
the time the participant took to remove their finger from the home key after a light has come on) 
and a movement time component (MT, the time between removing finger from the home key and 
pressing a response key). 
There were three conditions, which differed in the number of lights, either two, four, or 
eight, that needed to be monitored.  Each task was repeated 60 times and the median DT and MT 
for correct responses were recorded. 
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The display and response panel for odd-man-out reaction time (OMO) was the same as that 
used for CRT.  For each presentation of the OMO task, three of the eight lights illuminated.  The 
three lights were arranged so that the distance between the left light and the centre light was 
different to the distance between the right light and the centre light.  This was explained to the 
participants as a pair of lights (the two closest together) and an ‘odd-man-out’ (that light that is 
further away).  Following Frearson, Barrett and Eysenck (1988), 12 different displays (six being 
left-right mirror images of the other six) were chosen from the 44 alternative arrangements because 
they had been found to correlate most strongly with Raven’s matrices scores.  Each of the 12 
displays was presented five times, to produce 60 trials.  Both DT and MT for correct responses were 
recorded. 
In the Triplets Numbers test (Wittenborn, 1943) participants were required to evaluate three 
digits according to one or more rules.  Triplet 1: Press “YES” if the second number is the largest.  
Otherwise, press “NO”.  Triplet 2: Press “YES” if the second number is the largest and the third 
number is the smallest.  Otherwise, press “NO”.  Triplet 3: Press “YES” if the first number is the 
largest and the second number is the smallest or if the first number is the smallest and the third 
number is the largest.  Otherwise, press “NO”.  For each item, three digits were presented on the 
computer screen and participants had to press YES if they thought the digits matched the rule or NO 
if they did not.  Each triplet presented had an equal probability of requiring a YES or NO response.  
Each section consisted of 24 items and participants had to complete the whole set.  Correct decision 
speed was measured for each response, which led to three median correct decision speed measures 
(one for each section). 
For the Swaps test (Crawford, 1988), participants were instructed mentally to swap the order 
of three letters presented on the computer monitor and then to indicate the final order of the letters.  
A choice of solutions were presented at the bottom of the screen, numbered 1 to 6.  There were 
three sections of the test, which differed in the number of swaps required (2, 3, or 4 swaps). Each 
section had 24 items and participants had to complete all items. This produced three median correct 
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decision speed scores (one for each section).  The stimulus for each item was a different set of three 
letters, such that the participant never repeated the same task. 
Procedure 
The test sessions were done in groups of up to four participants and lasted about 1.5 hrs. 
Firstly, participants completed the perceptual speed tasks in the following order: Digit Symbol 
(DS), mental rotation (MR) and cross out (CO).  Each test was explained and participants 
completed practice items to ensure they understood the task requirements.  The three tests took 
about 7 minutes to complete. 
Next, the IT task was explained verbally followed by a series of practice trials to familiarise 
participants with the task.  In order to move on to the estimation stage, participants had to obtain 10 
correct trials out of 10 with a stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) = 835 ms, 10 correct trials out of 10 
with SOA = 418 ms and 9 correct trials out of 10 with SOA = 250 ms.  All of the participants met 
these criteria.  The estimation process began with SOA = 250 ms and followed an adaptive staircase 
algorithm (Wetherill & Levitt, 1965).  The algorithm required three correct responses at any SOA 
before reducing the SOA by 18 ms.  When an incorrect response was made the SOA increased by 
18ms.  The average SOA was calculated over eight reversals of direction on the staircase giving an 
estimate of the SOA with an associated probability of 79% of making a correct response.  The IT 
task took approximately 8 min to administer. 
CRT was administered next following the procedure of Jensen and Munro (1979).  
Preceding each condition, subjects completed 10 practice trials, all of which had to be completed 
correctly, to familiarise themselves with the task.  For the OMO task, completed after CRT, 
participants completed 20 practice trials, of which 18 had to be correct in order to move on to the 
task proper.  Participants were instructed not to lift their finger from the home key until they had 
made a decision about which light was the target.  Trials began when the participant pushed down 
on the home key. The RT tasks took about 20 min to administer. 
 
This is a post-print of an article published under the same title by Elsevier Ltd in the journal Personality and Individual Difference (vol. 35, no. 3, 2003, pp. 713-724). 
The published version can be found at: 
http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescription.cws_home/603/description#description 
The Triplet Numbers task was presented next.  The task was verbally explained to the 
participants along with instructions presented on the computer screen in front of them.  One 
example was displayed and explained to the participant along with an explanation of the response 
keys.  Participants were instructed to remember the rule because it was not shown at the start of 
each trial.  Once the rule was learned, participants completed 12 practice trials of which 10 had to 
be completed correctly.  This was followed by 24 test items.  Participants went through the same 
process of practice and trials for the second and then the third set of triplets.  The Triplets test took 
about 20 min to complete. 
The Swaps test was presented last and it was explained both verbally and on the computer 
screen.  The response keys were explained and both speed and accuracy were emphasised as being 
important.  All of the practice for this test, four items of each type of which three had to be done 
correctly, was done at the start followed by the 72 test items.  The items were presented randomly 
so that the participant did not know whether to expect a 2-swap, 3-swap, or 4-swap item on any 
trial.  The Swaps test took between 15 – 35 min. 
Results 
Table 1 shows the correlation matrix and descriptive statistics for the 18 variables in the 
battery.  Of note are the significant correlations of IT with OMO DT but not with any of the CRT 
measures and the significant correlation of IT with both Digit Symbol and Mental Rotation and with 
Triplet 1, Triplet 2, and all the Swaps measures.  Other correlations are consistent with 
expectations. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Exploratory factor analyses were carried out following the procedures outlined by Carroll 
(1993, 1995; see also Burns & Nettelbeck, in press).  Eighteen variables were included in the factor 
analysis; the three perceptual speed variables were reflected prior to analysis.  A five-factor 
orthogonal solution was well defined, there being at least two variables with their highest loadings 
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on each factor.  An oblique rotation was then performed on the five factor solution. Table 2 shows 
the structure loading matrix for this solution with the factors being interpreted as CDS, PSp, DT, 
MT and visualisation speed (VSp).  The correlation matrix for these five factors is at the bottom of 
Table 2.  It is worth noting the sizeable correlation between the CDS factor and the PSp factor. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
All five factors were considered acceptable for higher order analysis according to Kaiser’s 
(1981) criterion and the matrix yielded one second order factor, interpreted as Gs.  The loadings of 
the five factors on the second order factor are shown in Table 2; of particular note is that the Gs 
factor was near identical with the CDS factor. 
The exploratory model shown in Table 2 was estimated using AMOS (Arbuckle, 1999).  
The loadings shown in bold defined the five first-order factors except that OMO DT was also 
allowed to load on the DT factor and Triplet 1 and Triplet 2 were also allowed to load on VSp and 
PSp, respectively; all five factors loaded on a second-order factor (Gs).  This model provided an 
acceptable fit to the data (χ2 = 153.8, df = 127, p = 0.053; AGFI = 0.813; TLI = 0.974; RMSEA = 
0.046); however, both Triplet 1 and Triplet 2 had non-significant loadings on PSp and so these two 
paths were dropped from the model. 
It had not escaped our attention, however, that the CDS factor may simply reflect common 
method variance associated with the Swaps measures; to address this possibility we examined the 
validity of a four factor model in which the CDS factor was dropped and an aggregated Swaps 
variable was used as an additional marker of PSp.  This model provided a better fit to the data than 
the original model (χ2 = 115.5, df = 99, p = 0.123; AGFI = 0.837; TLI = 0.978; RMSEA = 0.041).  
In order to confirm the location of IT within this hierarchy, the model was run again omitting IT 
and calculating scores on each of the factors.  IT correlated significantly with factor scores for both 
VSp (r = .36, p < 0.001) and with PSp (r = .28, p < 0.01).  However, the partial correlation between 
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IT and PSp, controlling for VSp, was near-zero (r = .02, p = .83). Conversely, the partial correlation 
between IT and VSp, controlling for PSp, was statistically significant (r = .23, p < .05). 
The final model, then, is a four factor model consisting of PSp, VSp, DT and MT at the first 
level and a higher order Gs factor at the second level of analysis.  This factorial structure of mental 
speed is very similar to that presented by Stankov and Roberts (1997; Roberts & Stankov, 1999).  
Their model stated that MT, DT, PSp and CDS defined mental speed.  It is evident that their first 
three factors are confirmed but that a true CDS factor did not emerge from this dataset.  However, 
an additional first order speed factor, here interpreted as visualisation speed (VSp), also emerged.  
This factor subsumes the Triplets variables, OMO DT and IT.  It is worth noting that although all 
three triplets variables loaded on VSp in the confirmatory analysis, they displayed loadings on both 
VSp and PSp in the exploratory analysis.  
To summarise: IT correlated with a VSp factor and to a lesser degree with the PSp factor.  
However, the correlation between IT and PSp was near-zero when VSp was partialled out.  This 
finding provides evidence that the relationship between IT and IQ is likely mediated by the 
relationship between IT and Gs, via the construct visualisation speed which can be distinguished 
from perceptual speed as measured by tests like Digit Symbol.  However, the VSp and PSp factor 
appear to be closely related.  This latter point explicates the results reported by Burns and 
Nettelbeck (Burns & Nettelbeck, in press, Burns et al., 1999) and by Mackintosh and Bennett 
(2002). 
Discussion 
This investigation aimed to clarify the relationship between IT and IQ.  Factor analysis of 18 
speed of processing variables defined a model consisting of four narrow speed factors labelled: 
perceptual speed, visualisation speed, decision time and movement time.  The model includes a 
second-order general speed factor.  These factors are now briefly discussed. 
Perceptual speed (PSp).  This factor was defined mainly by Cross Out and Digit Symbol 
which had substantial loadings on this factor and near zero loadings on the other first-order factors.  
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Mental Rotation had its highest loading on this factor but also had a non-trivial loading on the 
visualisation speed factor (see below).  Triplet 1 had similar loadings on PSp and VSp in the 
exploratory analysis but the confirmatory analysis suggested Triplet 1 was more related to the VSp 
factor.  The Swaps aggregate score had a moderate loading on the PSp factor.  To the extent that 
this factor was defined primarily by classic clerical speed tests, it is reasonable to label this as a 
perceptual speed factor. 
Visualisation speed (VSp).  This factor is interpreted as representing the time needed to 
perform tests requiring somewhat complex visualisation of stimuli.  Confirmatory factor analysis 
suggested all three Triplets variables defined this factor. OMO DT has its highest loading on this 
factor and a substantial loading on the DT factor (see below).   IT also had its highest loading on 
this factor but near-zero loadings on the other first order factors.  Partial correlation analysis 
confirmed that IT is more related to VSp rather than PSp.  As already noted, Mental Rotation also 
had a substantial loading on this factor. 
Decision time (DT).  The choice DT variables defined this factor and OMO DT had a 
secondary loading on this factor.  This factor is interpreted as the time required to make a simple 
decision based on sensory information.  Interpretation of this factor is not controversial but it is 
acknowledged that the factor is very narrowly defined by this battery. 
Movement time (MT).  This factor is derived from reaction time tests that attempt to isolate 
movement time from decision time.  All measures of MT defined this factor.  It is worth noting that 
the DT and MT variables uncovered in this investigation were not independent from one another. 
General speed of processing (Gs).  This is the general factor of this battery.  It represents the 
speed at which people perform tasks ranging from somewhat complex cognitive tasks to simple 
sensory discriminations.  From Table 2 it can be seen that the loadings of the first order factors on 
Gs reflect the hypothesised complexity of processing required by the tasks that define those factors. 
Having discussed the nature of the outcomes of the factor analysis reported here, the 
question of the relation of IT to these factors can be addressed.  The results are then discussed with 
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respect to earlier studies.  Previously, IT has been shown to be a measure of general speed of 
processing (Burns & Nettelbeck, in press, Burns et al., 1999, Mackintosh & Bennett, 2002).  In this 
study, IT was related to visualisation speed, which is thought to measure the speed at which one 
visualises an image on which a decision must be made.  Vickers and Smith (1986, p.609) defined IT 
as “the time required by a subject to make a single observation or inspection of the sensory input on 
which a discrimination of relative magnitude is based”.  Even more specifically, Burns, Nettelbeck 
and White (1998) examined the psychophysical functions associated with various aspects of the IT 
task.  They demonstrated that IT cannot be rendered completely immune to the contamination of 
performance by the use of subtle visual cues, including the detection of apparent movement.  The 
nature of the IT task is such, therefore, that the detection of these visual cues is demanded under 
severe time constraints: it is plausible, then, that IT provides a measure of speed of visualisation 
(VSp); this construct itself is subsumed by general speed of processing (Gs). 
We turn now to the question of whether IT and reaction time measures share common 
variance with IQ.  First, it is clear that the variance both IT and CRT DTs share with IQ is not 
common although both measures fit into a hierarchical model of intelligence under a broad speed of 
processing factor.  The situation with respect to OMO DT is more complex.  As noted above, 
studies on IT and OMO DT have been equivocal; moreover, whether OMO DT measures fluid 
ability or not is unclear.  Burns and Nettelbeck (in press) reported IT and OMO DT as independent 
with the latter being a measure of Gf.  Roberts and Stankov (1999) also suggested that DT from a 
task they considered as equivalent to OMO DT was correlated with fluid ability.  The analyses here, 
however, show IT and OMO DT loading on the VSp factor.  The communality of OMO DT was 
quite low; it is therefore suggested that only a small part of variance in this measure is related to 
speed of processing abilities.  Specifically, OMO DT provides measures of visualisation speed and 
DT but, nonetheless, mainly measures fluid intelligence.  Such a suggestion fits with the extant 
literature on OMO DT. 
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The data presented here are highly supportive of the model of mental speed proposed by 
Roberts and Stankov (1999).  Their analysis revealed five group factors: MT, DT, Gs (speed of 
doing perceptual tasks), Tv/a (speed of doing tasks involving Gv and Ga) and Tir (speed of doing 
inductive reasoning tasks).  The first four of these factors were confirmed in the current study.  
Because Roberts and Stankov included inductive reasoning tasks in their battery and measured the 
speed of performance on these tasks, an inductive reasoning speed factor (Tir) emerged in their 
analysis.  Correspondingly, we could have labeled our CDS factor Tf/wm (speed of doing tasks 
involving Gf and working memory) but the swaps variables alone were too narrow to define such a 
factor.  The inference drawn is that if a diverse battery was administered, there may be speed factors 
associated with each of the second order factors defined in Gf – Gc theory.  Other models of mental 
speed (e.g., Horn, 1988; Carroll, 1993) have aspects that are inconsistent with the Roberts and 
Stankov model.  Horn (1988) described two-second order speed factors: CDS (speed at correctly 
solving more difficult cognitive tasks) and Gs (number correct scores from simple tasks such as 
perceptual tasks).  He showed that these two factors were correlated at a low level.  Carroll (1993) 
also proposed two second-order speed factors: broad cognitive speediness and processing speed.  
The cognitive speediness factor is defined by speed of test-taking, perceptual speed and numerical 
facility; the processing speed factor is defined by simple and choice decision time, mental 
comparison speed and semantic processing speed.  Thus, the processing speed factor is thought of 
as a DT factor.  It can be seen, therefore, that Carroll’s analysis differentiated speed at performing 
the psychometric tests from the more basic processing speed tests.  We conclude that the differences 
across these models are largely ones of emphasis.  We also alluded to the uncertainty of the order of 
analysis at which these various factors emerge and fit into the hierarchy of cognitive abilities.  The 
narrow focus of the current study does not allow resolution of these issues (see also Keith, 1997, 
Roberts & Stankov, 1999). 
The relationship between IT and intelligence has been clarified to some degree by the 
current study.  IT is related to intelligence because it is a measure of speed of processing.  Speed of 
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processing abilities are factorially complex, and IT provides a very specific measure of visualisation 
speed (although it may not be a strong marker of this construct).  Future studies in our laboratory 
will focus on test batteries including multiple tests of visualisation abilities.  This will allow us to 
define more adequately the visualisation speed factor and confirm that, at this detailed level of 
analysis, IT is independent from a perceptual speed factor. 
Finally, it is worth noting the low communality of IT (.206) in this battery.  The 
corresponding communality, in a much broader battery of tests, reported by Burns and Nettelbeck 
(in press) was .337, that is, somewhat higher but still indicative of marked specificity.  Moreover, in 
that study two versions of IT, one presented on a video monitor and the other using LEDs, 
correlated only r = .29.  Inspection time does not measure fluid abilities.  It must be inferred that IT 
has high specificity (given that its reliability is moderately high); therefore, manipulations of IT, 
and even longitudinal observations on IT, cannot assume that any changes (or stationarity) in the 
measure involve those aspects of IT variance that relate to intelligence and such issues remain to be 
tested empirically.  These observations warrant careful consideration by those who would use IT as 
a marker for Spearman’s g in various studies on the biological basis of intelligence. 
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Table 1 
Correlation matrix, means and standard deviations for 18 variables (N=102) 
1 DS 1 6 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
2 MR .421 
3 CO .631 .368
4 IT –.208 –.203 –.148
5 2 DT –.147 –.304 –.106 .133
6 2 MT .002 –.084 –.056 .033 .395
7 4 DT –.193 –.274 –.069 .110 .830 .317 
8 4 MT .001 –.083 –.109 .075 .247 .837 .230
9 8 DT –.129 –.203 –.050 .119 .716 .328 .784 .209
10 8 MT .012 –.024 –.066 .079 .175 .767 .209 .879 .145
11 OMO DT –.167 –.340 –.141 .354 .435 .278 .499 .232 .565 .152
12 OMO MT –.115 –.106 –.188 .131 .264 .663 .212 .751 .164 .729 .147
13 Triplet 1 –.407 –.352 –.413 .293 .224 .069 .166 .041 .213 –.007 .304 .095
14 Triplet 2 –.435 –.432 –.424 .321 .238 .077 .240 .090 .194 .074 .465 .184 .652  
15 Triplet 3 –.338 –.395 –.287 .161 .341 .043 .306 –.005 .276 –.059 .354 .068 .459 .531 
16 2–Swap –.566 –.370 –.544 .274 .240 .010 .248 .048 .175 .046 .268 .115 .406 .425 .459
17 3–Swap –.536 –.351 –.464 .252 .180 –.019 .197 .029 .117 .033 .260 .099 .302 .355 .361 .833
18 4–Swap –.545 –.398 –.444 .216 .267 .071 .262 .099 .183 .076 .311 .152 .280 .357 .379 .887 .904
Mean 65.3 52.1 32.8 62.1 282.3 147.1 292.4 150.2 317.3 155.9 569.3 169.6 850.5 1157.3 3014.7 11771 17746 23634
SD 10.7 12.1 6.5 16.2 32.4 24.5 31.8 24.2 37.7 25.4 128.8 34.9 195.7 269.6 1071.2 3091.8 4435.4 6540.5
   2 3 4 5  7 8 9       
                
                 
                
             
             
             
             
              
             
               
               
              
            
        
             
             
             
                 
                 
Note: Significant correlations (p<0.05) are shown in bold. 
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 Table 2 
 Factor structure matrix for oblique rotation of the five-factor solution, correlation matrix 
for the five factors and their loadings on the second order general speed factor (Gs) 
 MT DT VSp PSp CDS 
Digit Symbol .010 .040 –.005 .548 .061 
Mental Rotation –.007 .156 .209 .319 –.016 
Cross Out .136 –.060 .000 .605 –.014 
IT .025 –.021 .350 .059 .037 
2 DT .040 .788 –.012 .052 –.004 
2 MT .770 .202 –.001 .013 –.047 
4 DT –.008 .863 –.042 –.002 .038 
4 MT .919 .022 .016 .010 .008 
8 DT –.028 .773 .076 –.036 –.021 
8 MT .889 –.028 –.015 –.026 .045 
OMO DT .018 .357 .469 –.032 .014 
OMO MT .757 .019 .006 .138 –.019 
Triplet 1 –.024 .026 .471 .472 –.233 
Triplet 2 .017 –.003 .636 .466 –.229 
Triplet 3 –.113 .194 .326 .275 –.027 
2-Swaps –.013 .012 .044 .143 .554 
3-Swaps –.021 –.041 .004 .010 .677 
4-Swaps .026 .043 –.026 .002 .679 
      
 MT DT VSp PSp Gs 
MT .090 
DT .239 .315 
VSp .146 .315 .462 
PSp -.156 .142 .221 .618 
CDS .037 .228 .412 .644 .944 
Note: Highest loadings for each variable are shown in bold. 
MT is movement time; DT is decision time; VSp is visualisation speed; PSp is perceptual speed; 
CDS is correct decision speed; Gs is general speed of processing 
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